An RBC model with a rich fiscal sector by Almeida, Sara Cristina Cantarino Valente de
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in
Economics from the NOVA − School of Business and Economics.
An RBC Model with a rich fiscal sector
Sara Cristina Cantarino Valente de Almeida
Msc Student No. 512
A Project carried out in the under the supervision of:
Professor João Valle e Azevedo
And also with the collaboration of:
Sara Riscado (European University Institute)
January 7, 2013
1
An RBC Model with a rich fiscal sector*
Abstract
Contributing to the general understanding of fiscal policy effectiveness, this study consists
in the reformulation and estimation of the DSGE model developed in Azevedo and Ercolani
(2012), to measure the potential relations between the private sector and the consumption and
investment components of government expenditures. The estimation results show that public
consumption and capital have both a substitutability effect on private factors. For the study of
the dynamic effects, the model is augmented with strict fiscal rules, whose imposition creates
a "crowding-out" effect of the simulated fiscal policy shocks on government consumption and
investment.
Keywords: Public Spending Externalities, Public Investment Externalities, Fiscal Policy, Bayesian
Estimation.
1 Introduction
The large-scale fiscal stimulus packages recently applied to overcome the worldwide 2008 finan-
cial crisis triggered a general concern with fiscal policy effectiveness.
Focusing on the investigation of the several channels through which government spending and
investment can affect the private sector, this study contributes to the vivid discussion by revisiting the
concept of public externalities. Considering the existence of a substitution or complementarity rela-
tionship between public purchases and private factors, government spending and investment decisions
can have collateral effects on the household’s marginal utility of consumption and the production
function of final goods. In this context, the core of this work lies in qualifying the nature of such
relationships and observe how they influence the impact of fiscal policy.
For a wide scope of empirical literature on this subject the Ricardian equivalence holds and thus,
whether the government funds public expenditures through collecting taxes or issuing debt is irrelevant
from the household’s point of view. Growing apart from such framework, in the present model the
*I would like to express the deepest appreciation to Prof. João Valle e Azevedo for the excellent guidance,
advise and patience, and to Sara Riscado for precious comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank
Prof. Paulo Júlio for the discussion and availability and, finally, to Ana Filipa Salomão and Francisco Almeida
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setting for income taxes and lump-sum transfers from the government allow to observe the costs of
debt financing. How such alternative fiscal regime will coexist with the externalities channels in the
model economy is yet another key question this work tries to address.
We follow closely the model proposed in Azevedo and Ercolani (2012) to evaluate the nature of the
relationship between private and public consumption and investment. The model developed by these
authors will help us to understand the research question because it allows government consumption
to directly affect the marginal utility of consumption, through a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) consumption aggregator, and public capital to shift the productivity of private factors. We then
propose an extension of the model at two distinct levels. In the light of our main objectives, instead
of considering public capital productivity 1, a CES capital aggregator is added to production function
of final goods. Furthermore, following Traum and Yang (2010), two stabilizers of public debt, in the
form of income taxes and lump-sum transfers, are imposed to the fiscal policy sector.
Representing the externalities created by public consumption and capital on the private sector, the
CES aggregators combine the two types of productive inputs, allowing to observe relationship between
both. Moreover, the new fiscal rules enrich the analysis by changing the transmission mechanism of
fiscal shocks with fiscal variables responding to the level of the public debt.
Overall, our main interest rises from the fact that despite the extensive theoretical debate, few are
the ones who effectively quantify these relationships and observe their role in a model economy with
strict fiscal rules and a general production function. To answer our first purpose we estimate the model
through Bayesian methods, without fiscal rules. With the results obtained, we report several impulse
response functions and two dynamic multipliers related to government consumption an investment
shocks, with and without the augmentations described.
Using U.S. data from 1969 to 2008, the estimation results support a substitutability effect between
public and private consumption and, to a lesser extent, between public and private capital. Although
opposite to the evidence found in Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012) for an open economy, both
studies reflect the possibility of public and private capital having a weaker relationship than consump-
1Simultaneously with strong evidence of substitutability between public and private consumption, the results
in Azevedo and Ercolani (2012) achieved not so convincing evidence for the the effect of public investment on
private sector productivity, motivating the adoption of a different reasoning to approach such relationship.
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tion factors. When looking at the output dynamic multipliers, the value measured from the model
with the substitution effects decreases the impact of a public consumption shock from 0.95 to 0.07,
whereas with a shock in government investment the value of the output multiplier goes from 1.09 to
0.90, when the substitution effect of public capital is considered. In turn, the imposition of the fiscal
rules implies that both shocks have a significant negative effect on economy, due to the distortionary
properties of income taxation.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a brief review of literature on
the topic of interest. Section 3 describes the theoretical model of analysis, while section 4 presents the
quantitative analysis. Model dynamics are explained in section 5 and section 6 concludes, presenting
conclusions and final remarks.
2 Literature Review
The potential of expansionary policy to foster aggregate economic variables as output, consump-
tion or employment is an issue widely present in economic literature. Addressing this question, this
paper contributes to two main fields of fiscal policy analysis. First, it explores the existence of cause-
effect relationships between either public and private capital or consumption and, secondly, observes
the implications of assuming Non-Ricardian Households, through the imposition of strong fiscal rules.
Empirical results on the relationship between public and private consumption hold evidence on
both substitutability and complementarity hypothesis. A great set of earlier studies departs from a par-
tial equilibrium model, using Euler equations to estimate the value for the elasticity of substitution. For
example, Karras (1994) addresses different components of consumption, arriving to a general evidence
of complementarity between public and private consumption. In contrast, Graham (1993) performs
an extension to the model in Aschauer (1985), showing a crowding out effect of public consumption
on the private sector, under the assumption of permanent income. Diverging from these studies, our
analysis estimates the elasticity of substitution of both factors within a general equilibrium model, like
Bouakez and Rebei (2007). The authors use the maximum likelihood estimation method, finding that
a government spending shock leads to a persistent increase in the level of private consumption.
On the relationship between public and private capital, in Aschauer (1988) the author investigates
how public capital can have both a crowding in and out effect on private investment. For different pe-
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riods of the U.S. history, the analysis finds a substitutability effect between public and private capital,
as the national rate of capital accumulation rises with an increase in public investment. However, nar-
rowing the study, he also observes that public infrastructure capital fosters the productivity of private
capital stocks, thus raising private investment. In fact, both effects seem to have an important role in
economy, although the thesis of complementarity is slightly preferred among academics. Particularly,
some important contributors to this literature include studies on developing countries like Greene and
Villanueva (1991) or Blejer and Khan (1984).
Leaning now onto the last focus of our study, under Ricardian equivalence dynamics of fiscal
financing assume a passive role (see Leeper (1991)). In these cases, for market clearing purposes,
government debt is omitted from the analysis through the adjustment of lump-sump taxes. As an
alternative to such absence of public debt issuing theory, the fiscal section of the model economy in the
present study is grounded on the work of Traum and Yang (2010). Although with different purposes,
the data and assumptions of both studies are quite similar and so will be the fiscal rules. For the Euro
Area, Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012), while assessing the impact of the European Economics
Recovery Plan on the Euro Area GDP, estimates the model with fiscal rules and the aforementioned
externality channels. Our approach proposes a slight different study in the sense that they calibrate the
share of public capital on the CES aggregator to 90%, whereas we estimate the model unrestricting
the share of public capital and calibrating fiscal rules.
3 The Model
The model economy is an extension of the RBC model in Azevedo and Ercolani (2012), with a
more general production function and a more complex fiscal block, where income taxes and lump-sum
transfers from the government respond to the public debt level.
The Baseline model, which will be later subject to estimation, is achieved after replacing the pri-
vate capital factor in the production function, K j,t, by effective capital, K̃t, discarding public capital
productivity, KGt . Furthermore, the augmentation proposed is complete when labor and capital taxes
are replaced by an income tax, τi, and the lump-sum transfers from the government, Tt, are reformu-
lated.
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3.1 Households
The model is composed by households that, facing an inter-temporal budget constraint, will choose
the level of consumption Ct and work Lt that maximize their lifetime utility. Ct enters the utility
function through a CES aggregator of private and public consumption, Gt, specified as follows:
C̃t =
[
φ (Ct)
v−1
v + (1−φ)G
v−1
v
t
] v
v−1
, (1)
where ν ∈ (0;∞) is the elasticity of substitution between Ct and Gt and the weight of private consump-
tion in the effective consumption aggregator is given by φ.
The households, deriving utility from effective consumption and desutility from working, define
their lifetime expected utility as:
E0

∞∑
t=0
βkeε
b
t

(
C̃t −hC̃At−1
)1−σc
1−σc
−χ
1
1+σL
(Lt)1+σL

 , (2)
with β ∈ (0,1) as the subjective discount factor and and χ a positive number. εbt represents the
preference shock, assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error
term: εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 + η
b
t . The aggregate level of effective consumption at time t − 1,C̃
A
t−1, introduces
an external habit formation degree h ∈ (0;1). The parameter σc denotes the degree of relative risk
aversion and σL is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The existence of a steady-state
growth path is assured by assuming complete separability between consumption and labour, given the
neoclassical production function, but requiring setting σc equal to one.
Each household sets the levels of consumption, labor supply, next period’s physical capital stock,
Kt+1, level of investment, It, and installed capital stock utilization intensity, ut, subject to taxation
on labor (τw), consumption (τc) and capital (τk), expressed in marginal rates. They participate in a
market of state-contingent securities, paying Zht+1 at t + 1 if state h realizes, at the cost Et
[
1
1+rt,t+1
Zht+1
]
,
where 1/(1 + rt,t+1) is the stochastic discount factor. The budget constraint (expressed in real terms) is
represented as follows:
(1 +τc)Ct + It + Et
[
1
1 + rt,t+1
Zht+1
]
= (3)
Zht + (1−τ
w)WtLt + (1−τk)
[
rkt ut −a (ut)
]
Kt + DIVt −Tt,
where rkt is the net return on capital, WtLt is labor income and a (ut) = γ1 (ut −1)+
γ2
2 (ut −1)
2 represents
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the cost of using capital at intensity ut.DIVt are the dividends paid, while Tt are lump-sum transfers
from the government.
As capital enters the decision process with one period discrepancy, the link between capital stock
for two consecutive periods is given by:
Kt+1 = (1−δk) Kt + It
[
1−S
(
eε
I
t
It
It−1
)]
, (4)
where δk is the depreciation rate and investment adjustments costs are set in the function S (.), adopted
from Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). S (.) = κ2
(
eε
I
t It
It−1
− eγ
)2
, where εIt is a shock to the
investment cost function that follows a first-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error
term and γ is the steady-state growth rate of productivity.
3.2 Government and Fiscal Policy
For each period, public consumption Gt and investment I
g
t represent a determined fraction of
output, Gt = ξ
g
t Yt and I
g
t = ξ
ig
t Yt, where ξ
g
t and ξ
ig
t follow:
ξ
g
t = exp(ε
g
t + ss
g)/(1 + exp(εgt + ss
g)) ; ξigt = exp(ε
ig
t + ss
ig)/(1 + exp(εigt + ss
ig)).
In turn, real government expenditure and investment shocks, εgt and ε
ig
t respectively, are exogenous
and stochastic univariate first-order autoregressive processes:
ε
g
t = ρgε
g
t−1 +η
g
t (5)
ε
ig
t = ρigεi
ig
t−1 +η
ig
t , (6)
where ηgt and η
ig
t are normal i.i.d. and mutually independent with mean zero. ξ
g
t and ξ
ig
t are defined in
order to ssg and ssig, so that their steady-state levels are fixed :
ssg = log(ξg,ss/(1− ξg,ss)) ; ssig = log(ξig,ss/(1− ξig,ss)).
Given that in this model public investment is split into defense and non-defense items:
Ig,de ft = ξ
ig,de f
t Yt
ξ
g,de f
t = exp(ε
g,de f
t + ss
g,de f )/(1 + exp(εg,de ft + ss
g,de f ))
ε
ig,de f
t = ρig,de f εi
ig,de f
t−1 +η
ig,de f
t , (7)
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where defense investment is Ig,de ft , ss
g,de f = log(ξg,de f ,ss/(1− ξg,de f ,ss)) and ηig,de ft is a normal i.i.d.
defense investment shock with mean zero. Note that, with this specification, defense items are not
embedded in public capital Igt .
Since the paths of ξgt , ξ
ig
t and ξ
ig,de f
t are considered exogenous while the paths for Gt, I
g
t or I
g,de f
t
are not, facing a drop on the total factor productivity and the output level, government consumption
and investment are expected to fall, without intervention of automatic stabilizers.
Whenever the balanced budget hypothesis holds, the following expression defines the govern-
ment’s budget constraint:
τcCt +τwWtLt +τk
[
rkt ut −a (ut)
]
Kt + Tt = Gt + I
g
t + I
g,de f
t . (8)
With respect to the extension of the fiscal policy section, following Traum and Yang (2010), the
extended model sets income tax, τit, and lump-sum transfers from the government, Tt, to depend on
past levels of public debt, Bt.The equations for both fiscal rules, measured in deviations from the
steady-state (denoted with hats), are:
τ̂it = ρτ̂τ
i
t−1 + (1−ρτ)γτb̂rt−4 +ε
τ
t (9)
T̂t = ρzT̂t−1 + (1−ρz)γzb̂rt−1 +εzt (10)
where b̂rt is the debt-to-output ratio, B̂t/Yt, and ετt and ε
z
t are, respectively, the exogenous shocks
of income tax and lump-sum transfers, both following an i.i.d. normal distribution.
As a result, the new budget constraints for the government and households are respectively defined
as:
τcCt +τit(WtLt +
[
rkt ut −a (ut)
]
Kt) + Tt + (1 + rbt )Bt−1 = Bt +Gt + I
g
t + I
g,de f
t (11)
and
(1+τc)Ct + It +Et
[
1
1 + rt,t+1
Zht+1
]
+ Bt = Zht + (1−τ
i
t)(WtLt +
[
rkt ut −a (ut)
]
Kt)+DIVt− (1+rbt )Bt−1−Tt,
(12)
where rbt represents the interest the government needs to pay relative to the debt owed in the
previous period, Bt−1.
3.3 Firms and labor market
Each firm j, under a monopolistic competitive set, produces a single variety of final goods Y j,t with
the same elasticity of substitution across all goods varieties. Independently from the firm, households
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allocate their consumption equally between all goods. In this framework, we can abandon index j and
consider a representative firm that produces a final good Yt, using effective capital K̃t, labor Lt and
the fraction of public capital that does not produce any externality, represented by the defense public
investment Ig,de ft . From the solution of the profit maximization problem, competitive firms set price
level P j,t as a markup λp,ss to the marginal cost. The production function is then given by2:
Y j,t = max(AtK̃αt L
1−α
j,t −AtΦ,0), (13)
where Φ is the production fixed cost and At is a productivity shock. The process for ln(At) has a
unit-root and evolves according to:
ln(At) = γ+ ln(At−1) +εat , (14)
where γ is the steady-state growth rate of productivity and εat = ρaε
a
t−1 +η
a
t , where η
a
t is an i.i.d.-normal
sequence.
The effective capital CES aggregator, K̃t adopted from Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012) is
adjusted to enter the final goods production function of firms, allowing to measure the elasticity of
substitution between public and private investment, vk:
K̃t =
[
φk (Kt)
vk−1
vk + (1−φk) (KGt )
vk−1
vk
] vk
vk−1
, (15)
where φk is the share of private capital stock in effective physical capital and KGt denotes the
"productivity" of public capital. Relatively to the elasticity of substitution, when vk1 private and
public capital are substitutes, for values lower than 1, as it tends to zero the complementarity effect
emerges and if vk = 1 any cause-effect relationship is observed.
The public capital and the productivity of defense capital are assumed to evolve respectively ac-
cording to: KGt+1 = (1−δKg)K
G
t + ξ
ig
t , (16)
and
KG,de ft+1 = (1−δKg,de f )K
G,de f
t + ξ
ig,de f
t (17)
where δKg is the depreciation rate.
With respect to the Labor Market, households answer the demand that allows setting the wage rate
2The specification is the same as in the model of Azevedo and Ercolani (2012), but in our model KGt enters
the production function through the CES aggregator and since we discard the productivity of public capital
KG,de ft is irrelevant to the Production function and can be omitted.
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Wi,t that maximizes their utility, according to labor demand, Lt, and aggregate nominal wage, Wt.The
wage setting defines Wi,t as a markup λw,t, over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. λw,t is stochastic and exogenous and follows a first order autoregressive process.
3.4 Remaining Considerations
In a standard Real Business Cycle model, prices have perfect flexibility, automatically adjusting
to assure market clearing conditions under perfect competition. In equilibrium, supply will equal
demand, for every market. Labour demanded by firms equals differentiated labour services supplied
by households, at the aggregate wage rate Wt , capital services demanded by firms equals capital
supplied by households and the final goods supply equals demand by households and the government:
Yt = Ct + It + a (ut) Kt +Gt + I
g
t + I
g,de f
t . (18)
3.4.1 The Solution
The process for the solution of the steady-state followed the standard procedure of DSGE models
solution. Considering identical agents, the first order conditions associated with the households’ and
firms’ problems are derived and combined with market clearing conditions and exogenous processes.
The variables subject to generational growth Ct, It, Kt, Wt, Taxt, Tt, Gt, I
g
t , I
g,de f
t and Bt need to be
stationarized by the level of technology At. The same treatment is required for the Lagrange multipliers
associated with the budget constraint and the capital accumulation equation, respectively Λt and Qt
(Tobin’s q). The conditions which solve the equilibrium for the present model can be found in the
Appendix C. For estimation purposes, apart from variables ξgt , ξ
ig
t and ξ
ig,de f
t , the model equations are
log-linearized around the steady state.
4 Identification, Calibration and Estimation
With U.S. quarterly data from 1969Q1 to 2008Q3, the baseline model is identified and estimated
by Bayesian methods, using the statistical software platform DYNARE of Matlab.
From the acknowledgment of unidentification issues on the estimation of DSGE models, our anal-
ysis attains the identification sufficient conditions established in Iskrev (2010), leaving the analysis on
the strength of identification for later improvements to the study.
For an RBC model, the parameters identification can be established by the moment or the in-
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formation based approach, but only the former is used in the identification package developed for
DYNARE3.
Without an exhaustive description of the concept, consider a parameter space Θ ⊂ Rk, defined
as the set of all theoretically admissible values of the deep parameters vector θ. Given the observed
data, it is possible to define mT : [µ′,σ′T ]
′, a (T −1)`2 +`(`+3)/2−dimensional vector that collects the
parameters which determine the first two moments of the data, µ′ and σ′T . It follows that mT is a func-
tion of θ, assuming that to each admissible value of θ corresponds a unique value of τ, the vector of
the reduced form parameters. In case the model’s random vector of structural shocks, ut, is Gaussian
and no further assumptions on structural shocks are established, the restrictions on mT have all the
useful information for the estimation of θ. The parameter is identified if that information is sufficient
according to the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Considering mT as a continuously differentiable function of the vector of deep
parameters θ, θ0 is locally identifiable if the Jacobian Matrix J(T ) =
δmq
δθ′ has full column
rank at θ0, for q ≤T.
When q = T , this conditions is only sufficient for identification if ut is normally distributed. In addition
is also required that the number of deep parameters does not exceed the dimension of mt.
Because the distribution of the data depends on θ through τ the program yet triggers the Jacobian4
of the transformation from θ to τ, J2(T ). Point θ0 is locally identifiable if the rank of J2(T ) = δτδθ′ is
equal to the dimension of θ. Note that, in practice, deep parameters are unknown. To overcome this
issue the program relies on the prior distributions set by the analyst, assuming the mean values as the
deep parameters of the model.
With both rank conditions verified, this section proceeds with the report of the Bayesian estima-
tion5 results and calibrated parameters. For estimation purposes, seven observable macroeconomic
time-series are considered, mapped from the data through measurement equations in log-differences,
3The information matrix is used for the sensitivity analysis, which we do not address in our study
4Denoted by H in DYNARE.
5Dynare uses a Bayesian MH-MCMC algorithm, performing different iterations chains. The initial parame-
ters values and the prior distributions allow for the program to run the different chains starting at different points
in the parameter space and find the mode and mean around which each parameter is centered.
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except for consumption and investment, which are specified in levels. Data description and measure-
ment equations are described in Appendix D.
Bayesian estimation combines the prior probabilities of the parameters with the likelihood func-
tion, which when maximized finds the values of the parameters that more probably generated the data,
given the prior values defined. This posterior distribution is obtained as:
p(θ|YT ) =
L(YT |θ)p(θ)
∈ L(YT |θ)p(θ)dθ
,
the quotient between the likelihood L(YT |θ) and its marginal value, of sample Y, with T observa-
tions and where p(θ) is the prior probability of vector θ.
Calibrations and priors imposed to the model’s parameters are shown in Table I. The calibrations
enter the estimation process as very strict priors. Generally, these parameters directly affect the steady-
state, whereas the ones defining the dynamics of the model are preferably estimated. vk and v are
re-parameterized to vk = evik and v = evb ∈(-∞;+∞), normally distributed with mean −1 and standard
deviation 10. For values less than unity, as vk tends to zero, public and private capital become more
complements. They are considered substitutes for the opposite space and not related if vk = 1. The
share of private capital on the final goods production function, φk is uniformly distributed in the range
[0,1]. Finally, we want to make clear the Fiscal Strategy model is not subject to estimation and thus,
tax values are fixed. Nevertheless, on behalf of the remaining empirical evidence we need to specify
the calibrations applied to the components of the fiscal rules, ρz, ρt, γz, gammat and the steady state
levels of brt and tauit, brss
6 and tauiss.
The estimation results for three variations of the baseline model are presented in Table II 7. Firstly,
φk and φ are both set to unity, showing a model economy where government decisions do not have
collateral effects on private inputs. The next stage studies the externality channel on utility, only
restricting φk. Finally, the model is estimated without the imposition of any restrictions.
The highest marginal data is achieved when the externality channel on the production function is
closed, with the share of private consumption on utility estimated to be around 52%. As the result
obtained in Azevedo and Ercolani (2012), government and private consumption are estimated to be
6The calibrated value in each quarter corresponds to an annual public debt to output ratio around 50% in the
steady state.
7For further results see Appendix B.
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Table I: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Justification
β 0.995 Real interest rate (yearly) ≈ 4%
δk 0.025 Depreciation rate (yearly) = 10%
δkg 0.025 "
θkg,de f 0.0 Azevedo and Ercolani(2012)
τw 0.223 Leeper et al. (2009)
τk 0.184 Leeper et al. (2009)
τc 0.028 Leeper et al. (2009)
τiss 0.20 Traum and Yang(2010)
brss 1.98 Traum and Yang(2010)
λp 0.20 Christiano et al. (2005)
λw 0.05 Christiano et al. (2005)
ρz 0.99 Traum and Yang(2010)
ρt 0.98 "
γz 0.00 "
γt 0.01 "
χ Varying s.t. n_ss = 0.31
γ1 Varying rkss, eq’m. relation
strongly substitutes with a posterior mean for νib of 8.4. Relatively to νik, public and private investment
seem also to be substitutes, but with a weaker relationship. However, the wide confidence interval8 of
the estimated parameter leaves some reservations regarding the strength of such effect and the accuracy
of the estimation9. Besides, the share of private capital φk is estimated to be 85% with the unrestricted
version, but the accuracy of the model slightly decreases10, which shows preference for the model
with φk equal to one. Curiously, the main results are opposite to those found in Coenen, Straub
and Trabandt (2012) 11 for an open economy. Still, also in their study, the elasticity of substitution
between public and private capital is lower than the one between public and private consumption. In
between, Mazraani (2010) finds a substitution effect between private and public consumption and a
8Appendix B.
9Identification issues seem to damage the estimation of this parameter. Further investigations should be done
regarding its specification and contribution to the model.
10Following the work of Smets and Wouters (2003),the overall fit of DSGE models can be measured by its
marginal data density, useful for comparison purposes.
11Please recall that the share of private investment is calibrated by the authors to 90%, the parameter φk in
our model.
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complementarity effect between public and private investment.
Table II Priors and Posteriors of selected parameters 1969Q1-2008Q3
Total Separability, Utility Channel and Unrestricted
Parameter PRIOR POSTERIOR
φk = φ = 1 φk = 1 Unres.
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean
Utility function
σL Normal 2 0.5 0.63 0.77 0.70 0.92 0.74 0.84
ν_b Normal −1.0 10 − − 3.58 8.95 3.79 8.64
φ Uni f orm [0,1] − − 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.52
Production function
Φ Normal 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
α Normal 0.3 0.02 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34
νi_k Normal −1.0 10 − − − − 2.24 7.07
φk Uni f orm [0,1] − − − − 0.88 0.85
Investment Adj. costs
κ/100 Normal 4 0.5 4.65 4.68 4.64 4.64 4.67 4.65
γ2 Normal 0.0685 0.002 0.036 0.037 0.033 0.034 0.03 0.03
Constant terms
γ/100 Normal 0.4 0.02 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
ξg,ss Normal 0.16 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
ξig,ss Normal 0.025 0.01 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026
ξg,de f ,ss Normal 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008
Laplace Log D Dens. 2573.14 2581.41 2580.59
Log D Dens. 2573.62 2581.41 2580.59
5 Model Dynamics
5.1 Dynamic Effects
The following section analyses impulse response functions to a shock both in government con-
sumption and investment and tries to unveil the main implications behind the imposition of the ex-
ternalities channels and fiscal rules. For the simulations we use the posterior mode of the parameters
estimated for the unrestricted model12, which generate the lines in the plots displayed from figure 1
to 3.2 in Appendix A. Specifically, figure 1 presents the impulse response functions of a one standard
deviation increase in public consumption, figure 2 shows the impact of a shock with the same magni-
tude in public investment and in figures 3.1 and 3.2 are alternative versions of the augmented model,
12Although the unrestricted version is not preferred, we opt to use this version since it allows to observe the
effects of both externalities channels.
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again subject to a shock in government spending.
Conditional on specific parameterization (summarized in table III) we define four different ver-
sions of the model: the Total Separability (i) , the Utility Channel (ii), the Public externality (iii) and
the Fiscal Strategy (iv). The notation adopted gives intuition for the mechanisms observed in each
version. Looking at the figures, the first version, with a dashed grey line, shows the reaction of a
model without either substitution effects or fiscal rules (φ = φk = 1). Secondly, (ii) considers the public
externality on private consumption and in (iii) we add the substitutability between public and private
capital, which are respectively represented by the blue and red dashed lines. Finally, a solid black line
is traced for the model with strict fiscal rules13.
Moreover, in the final version –Fiscal Strategy – income tax, τit, depends on the level of public debt
one year ago, Bt−4, and supports by itself the burden of public debt (γz = 0, as earlier shown in Table
I). We further explore this specification by setting different timings for the government’s reaction and
by assuming lump sum transfers to share the funding of public debt with τit.
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Table III - Parameterization
I. BenchmarkModel
a. Total separability: φk, φ = 1
b. Utility channel φk = 1, φ = 0.54
νb = 3.4
c. Public Externalities φk = 0.88, φ = 0.52
νb = 3.79, νik = 2.24
II. Fiscal StrategyModel
a. With lump-sum tax mechanism: γz = 0.01
b. For different reaction periods: t−1, t−4, t−12
Regarding the shock in government consumption (figure 1), with the Total Separability model,
output, the interest rate and the level of labor are upward driven, in contrast with private consump-
tion, investment and wage level. In turn, when subject to the public externality, private consumption
decreases further, because families suffer from the combination of a negative wealth and substitution
effect. With respect to the remaining variables, this shock loses impact and the return to the steady is
13Note that although this version was not subject to estimation, this exercise still adopts the posterior mode
estimates of the unrestricted model. We simply adjust thePublic externality version with the imposition of the
fiscal rules to get the Fiscal Strategy framework.
14The legend for the respective plots are in Appendix A, along with the figures.
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considerably faster. Regarding the Fiscal Strategy model, the decrease of private investment is empha-
sized and the decrease in consumption gains persistence. The distortionary tax represents an opposing
force to the shock’s expansionary effect and leads output to decrease soon after impact. In addition,
an increase on taxes also generates a disincentive to work, reducing the number of hours individuals
devote to labor.
Turning to the effect of a shock in government investment (figure 2), please recall that in the
context of the Public Externalities framework public capital competes with private capital. With
an increase of the former, the interest rate increases on impact and there is an incentive for private
agents to slowdown investment. However, in this case, the negative substitution effect is dominated
by a positive wealth effect and investment increases around 6 years after impact. In parallel with the
dynamics observed for the previous shock, in the long run, the imposition of fiscal rules represents a
deterioration of the living standards at al levels.
Focusing on the Fiscal Strategy Model, when government transfers share the funding of the public
debt level with tax (figure 3.1), the fiscal policy shock is less damaging. Income taxation, τi, reaches
a lower maximum level and the steady state is sooner re-attained. As a result, the output period of
adjustment is also shorter and debt reacts to a lesser extent, inclusively dropping with the course of
recovery.
Finally, we assume the government reacts to the debt level by increasing income taxes at the first
quarter (t−1) or three years after impact (t−12) (figure 3.2), in alternative to the baseline assumption
of one year (t−4). Although the marginal effect is quite low, there is evidence that if government waits
longer before increasing taxes the increase will have to be stronger than if the reaction is immediate.
5.2 Government Consumption and Investment Multiplier
Resorting to the formulation in Mountford and Uhlig (2009), to quantify the influence of fiscal
policy, dynamic multipliers are computed by discounting the cumulated responses of output facing
one standard deviation policy shock. The value for the dynamic multiplier expressed for t quarters
after the shock is given by:
ϕt =
t∑
k=1
(1 + rss)−k∆yk
t∑
k=1
(1 + rss)−k∆gk
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where ∆yk represents the deviation of output from its steady-state at time k and ∆gk represents
the marginal variations of government purchases measured as a fraction of the steady-state output. rss
is the steady-state real interest rate. This multiplier measures the cost of returning to equilibrium, in
output terms, inherent to an increase in government consumption/investment.
In tables IV and V are presented the results of the dynamic multipliers of output, in response to
the government policy shocks, for different periods.
When any of the externalities mechanism is allowed, the shock of public consumption has a strong
effect on output, with the respective impact multiplier reaching a maximum level of 0.95, slightly
different from the 1.072 found with the baseline model in Straub and Tchakarov (2007). With public
consumption affecting the utility function, the impact on output is much smaller due to the negative
wealth and substitution effects on households consumption. Remarkably, the high estimated value of
48%15 for the share of public capital on the effective consumption function causes such a low value of
the multiplier with the model’s preferred version.
After the the introduction of fiscal rules, the contractionary effect on output is evident in the long-
run. Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012) uses the same formulation of the multiplier, but finds an
effect of 1.02 on impact and 0.84 in the long-run, with consumption and labour taxes adjusting to the
public debt value.
Finally, the output to government investment multiplier for the first quarter decreases from 1.09 to
0.90 when the substitution effect between public an private capital is considered.
All in all, the model dynamics show that a shock in public consumption is generally unproductive,
opposite to the effect of an increase in public investment.
Table IV - Dynamic Multipliers, Government Consumption Shock on Output Y
Quarters 1 2 4 8 12 24 48 72 100
Fiscal Rules 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 −0.01
Public Externalities 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Utility Channel 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Total Separability 0.95 0.90 0.82 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62
15The share of public capital in the CES aggregator is given by (1−φk).
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Table V - Dynamic Multipliers of Government Investment Shock on Output Y
Quarters 1 2 4 8 12 24 48 72 100
Fiscal Rules 0.80 0.74 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.49
Public Externalities 0.90 0.82 0.72 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.63
Utility Channel 0.92 0.84 0.73 0.62 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.50
Total Separability 1.09 1.03 0.92 0.81 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.67
6 Concluding Remarks
Two main objectives have driven this study. On one hand, an attempt was made to complement the
evidence found in Azevedo and Ercolani (2012) by establishing a more general production function.
On the other, in order to observe how the imposed channels behave under a more realistic fiscal policy,
the set up economy is extended with more complex fiscal rules.
The empirical evidence shows a substitution relationship between private and public capital. else
constant, as public investment increases, firms seem to be discouraged to invest. However, the pres-
ence of this externality on the estimated model does not constitute the preferred version and the respec-
tive elasticity of substitution is estimated in a wide confidence interval. Given the lack of robustness
in these results and the limited set of DSGE models applications to this study, the overall validity of
our conclusion is questionable and there is a need for further investigation.
As for public and private consumption, results support the evidence found in Azevedo and Ercolani
(2012), showing the model is able to fit the data with a strong substitutability effect even adopting a
normal prior distribution centered in complementarity. In this framework, the substitutability effect
reduces the capacity of a shock in government spending to foster the output level.
Regarding fiscal policy, when the income tax is used to stabilize public debt, affecting the families
disposable income, economy contracts. Depending on the labor supply elasticity and the distortionary
power of the income tax, output may be crowded out by an initially expansionary policy, which seems
to be a better approximation to real business cycle dynamics. Intuitively, for later improvements to the
present study we suggest the estimation of the model with the fiscal rules.
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Appendix A: Impulse Response Functions
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Figure 1. Effects on output (Y), consumption (C), investment (I), wages (W), hours (L) and return on capital (rt), of a one standard
deviation government consumption shock. The dashed grey line is the IRF obtained with the “Total Separability" model (φ = 1, φk = 1),
the dashed blue line corresponds to “Utility Channel" model, the red line represents the “Public Externalities model" and finally the solid
black line is the Fiscal Strategy response.
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Figure 2. The Fiscal Strategy model: effects on output (Y), consumption (C), investment (I), wages (W), hours (L) and return
on capital (rt), of a one standard deviation government investment shock. The dashed grey line is the IRF obtained with the “Total
Separability" model (φ = 1, φk = 1), the dashed blue line corresponds to “Utility Channel" model, the red line represents the “Public
Externalities model" and finally the solid black line is the Fiscal Strategy response.
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Figure 3.1 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of the Fiscal Strategy model: effects on output (Y), public debt (B) and income tax
(τi) of a one standard deviation government consumption shock. The dashed grey line is the IRF obtained with lump-sum tax responding
to public debt and the solid black line corresponds to the originalFiscal Strategy model (t = 4).
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Imediate and Late Fiscal Policy Reaction
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Figure 3.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of the Fiscal Strategy model: effects on output (Y), public debt (B) and income
tax (τi) of a one standard deviation government consumption shock. The pointed grey line is the IRF obtained with a late tax increase
(t = 12), the dashed line is the result when the reaction of the government is imediate (t = 1) and the solid black line corresponds to the
originalFiscal Strategy model (t = 4).
Appendix B: Estimation Results
Table I - B Priors and Posteriors of selected parameters 1969Q1-2008Q3
Utility Channel specification vs. Unrestricted
Parameter PRIOR POSTERIOR
φk = 1 Unrestricted
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean 5% 95% Mode Mean 5% 95%
A. Utility function
σL Normal 2 0.5 0.70 0.92 0.43 1.41 0.74 0.84 0.46 1.24
ν_b Normal −1 10 3.59 8.96 0.53 17.23 3.79 8.64 0.69 16.9
φ Uni f orm [0,1] 0.54 0.55 0.42 0.67 0.52 0.52 0.39 0.64
B. Production function
Φ Normal 0.05 0.02 0.009 0.02 0.00 0.039 0.007 0.022 0.00 0.04
α Normal 0.3 0.02 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.35
νi_k Normal −1 10 − − − − 2.24 7.07 −0.63 15.1
φk Uni f orm [0,1] − − − − 0.88 0.85 0.73 0.99
C. Investment Adj. costs
κ/100 Normal 4 0.5 4.64 4.64 3.89 5.38 4.67 4.65 3.92 5.40
γ2 Normal 0.0685 0.002 0.033 0.034 0.029 0.039 0.03 0.029 0.023 0.035
D. Constant terms
γ/100 Normal 0.4 0.02 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.43
ξg,ss Normal 0.16 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17
ξig,ss Normal 0.025 0.001 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.028
ξg,de f ,ss Normal 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008
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Table II - B Priors and Posteriors of Shocks parameters 1969Q1-2008Q3
Utility Channel specification vs. Unrestricted
Parameter PRIOR POSTERIOR
φk = 1 Unrestricted
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean 5% 95% Mode Mean 5% 95%
A. Autoregressive Parameters
ρb Beta 0.5 0.2 0.77 0.75 0.71 0.80 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76
ρa Beta 0.5 0.2 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.17
ρI Beta 0.5 0.2 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.95
ρw Beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 0.93 0.88 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.96
ρg Beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.93 0.97
ρig Beta 0.5 0.2 0.94 0.90 0.91 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.95
ρig,de f Beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99
B. Standard deviation of shocks
σb Inv Gamma 0.1 2.0 2.94 2.93 2.53 3.31 2.92 2.76 2.72 2.80
σa Inv Gamma 0.1 2.0 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017
σI Inv Gamma 0.1 2.0 0.042 0.042 0.029 0.056 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.042
σw Inv Gamma 0.1 2.0 0.026 0.034 0.020 0.050 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.027
σg Inv Gamma 0.1 2.0 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016
σig Inv Gamma 0.1 2.0 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.033 0.030 0.03 0.029 0.030
σig,de f Inv Gamma 0.1 2.0 0.054 0.055 0.048 0.062 0.054 0.055 0.049 0.062
Appendix C: Equilibrium Conditions with Transformed Variables
Equilibrium conditions follow from the first order conditions (F.O.C.s) of households’ and firms’
problems while imposing symmetry, fiscal policy equations, market clearing conditions and processes
for the exogenous processes. Variables Ct, It, Kt, Wt , Taxt, Tt, Gt, I
g
t , I
g,de f
t and Bt are divided by the
level of technology, At. Lower case letters indicate transformed variables. The same treatment is re-
quired for the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the capital accumulation
equation, respectively λt and qt (Tobin’s q).
• Consumption F.O.C.:
(1 +τc)λt exp(−(γ+εat )) = e
εbt
φ( c̃tct
) 1
v [(̃
ct exp(γ+εat )− γ̃ct−1
)−1] (19)
• Aggregator (consumption): c̃t =
[
φ (ct)
v−1
v + (1−φ) (gt)
v−1
v
] v
v−1
(20)
• Labor supply F.O.C.: λt =
χLσnt
(1−τw)wt
(21)
• Risk free asset F.O.C.: βEt
[
λt+1
λt
exp(−(γ+εat+1))(1 + rt)
]
= 1 (22)
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• Investment F.O.C.:
λt = λtqtEt

1− κ2
(
eε
I
t
it exp(γ+εat )
it−1
− eγ
)2− itit−1 exp(γ+εat )κeεIt
(
eε
I
t
it exp(γ+εat )
it−1
− eγ
)+
(23)
+βEt
λt+1qt+1 exp(−(γ+εat+1))(eεIt+1 it+1 exp(γ+εat+1)it
)2
κeε
I
t+1
(
eε
i
t+1
it+1 exp(γ+εat+1)
it
− eγ
)
• Next period capital F.O.C.:
λtqt = Et
[
βλt+1 exp(−(γ+εat+1))r
k
t+1ut+1−a (ut+1)](1−τ
k) + qt+1 (1−δ)
]
(24)
where a (ut) = γ1 (ut −1) +
γ2
2 (ut −1)
2 represents the cost of using capital at intensity ut.
• Capital law of motion:
kt+1 = (1−δ)kt exp(−(γ+εat )) + it
1− κ2
(
eε
I
t
it exp(γ+εat )
it−1
− eγ
)2 (25)
• Capacity utilization F.O.C.: rkt = a
′ (ut) = γ1 +γ2 (ut −1) (26)
• MRS consumption/labor: mrst = eε
b
t
χLσnt
(1 +τc)λt
(27)
• Wage markup: 1 +λw,t =
wt(1−τw)
mrst
(28) 1 +λw,t =
wt(1−τit)
mrst
(29)
• Production function:
yt = exp(−α(γ+εat ))̃k
α
t (Lt)
1−α)−Φ (30)
• Aggregator (capital):
k̃t =
[
φ (kt)
vk−1
vk + (1−φ) (kgt )
vk−1
vk
] vk
vk−1
(31)
• Factor demands:
(1−α)
yt
Lt(1 +λp,ss)
= wt (32) α
yt
k̃t(1 +λp,ss)
exp(γ+εat )φk
 k̃tkt
 1vk = rkt (33)
• Marginal cost:
MCt =
(
rkt
)α
w1−αt
αα (1−α)1−αφk
(
k̃t
kt
) 1
vk (KG,de ft )
θg,de f
(34)
• Price markup:
1
MCt
= 1 +λp,ss (35)
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• Evolution of the productivity of public capital:
KGt+1 = (1−δKg)K
G
t + ξ
ig
t (36)
where ξigt = i
g
t /yt = exp(ε
ig
t + ss
ig)/(1 + exp(εigt + ss
ig)) and ssig = log(ξig,ss/(1− ξig,ss))
KG,de ft+1 = (1−δKg,de f )K
G,de f
t + ξ
ig,de f
t (37)
where ξig,de ft = i
g,de f
t /yt = exp(ε
ig,de f
t + ss
ig,de f )/(1+exp(εig,de ft + ss
ig,de f )) and ssig,de f = log(ξig,de f ,ss/(1−
ξig,de f ,ss))
• Government consumption:
ξ
g
t = gt/yt = exp(ε
g
t + ss
g)/(1 + exp(εgt + ss
g)) (38)
where ssg = log(ξg,ss/(1− ξg,ss))
• Fiscal Rules:
τ̂it = ρτ̂τ
i
t−1 + (1−ρτ)γτb̂rt−4 +ε
τ
t (39)
T̂t = ρzT̂t−1 + (1−ρz)γzb̂rt −1 +εzt
• Government budget:
– Balanced:
τcct +τwwtLt +τk
[
rkt ut −a (ut)
]
kt + tt = ξ
g
t yt + ξ
ig
t yt + ξ
ig,de f
t yt (40)
– Fiscal Strategy Model:
τcct +τit
(
wtLt +
[
rkt ut −a (ut)
]
kt) + tt + (1 + rbt )bt−1 = bt + ξ
g
t yt + ξ
ig
t yt (41)
• Shocks processes: εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 +η
b
t (42)
εIt = ρiε
I
t−1 +η
I
t
εat = ρaε
a
t−1 +η
a
t
ε
g
t = ρgε
g
t−1 +η
g
t
ε
ig
t = ρigεi
ig
t−1 +η
ig
t
ετt = ρτεi
τ
t−1 +η
τ
t
εTt = ρTεi
T
t−1 +η
T
t
ε
ig,de f
t = ρig,de f εi
ig,de f
t−1 +η
ig,de f
t
λw,t = (1−ρw)λw,ss +ρwλw,t−1 +ηwt
Appendix D: Data Description
Tables bellow summarize the data and notation for the observed variables. Azevedo and Ercolani
(2012) followed Smets and Wouters (2007).
Table I - D Data Sources
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Variable Designation Source CODE
Gross Domestic Product (Nominal) GDP U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA A191RC1
Personal Cons. Expenditures (Nominal) C U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA DPCERC1
Personal Cons.Expenditures - Durables (Nominal) Durables U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA DDURRC1
Private Fixed Domestic Investment (Nominal) PFI U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA A007RC1
Federal Cons. Expenditures (Nominal) G_Federal U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA A957RC1
State & Local Cons. Expenditures (Nominal) G_StateLocal U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA A991RC1
State & Local Gross Investment (Nominal) IG_StateLocal U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA A799RC1
Gross Domestic Product Deflator GDPDEF U.S. Dep. of Commerce - BEA GDPDEF
Hourly Compensation, Non Farm Sector (Nominal) Wages Bureau of Labor Statistics PRS85006103
Civilian noninstitutional population, 16 years and over POPULATION Bureau of Labor Statistics LNU00000000Q
Table II -D - Observables for measurement equations
Yobst =(GDP/GDPDEF)/POPULATION
Cobst =((C-Durables)/GDPDEF)/POPULATION
Iobst =((PFI+Durables)/GDPDEF)/POPULATION
Wobst =(Wages/GDPDEF)/POPULATION
ξ
g,obs
t =(G_Federal+G_StateLocal)/GDP
ξ
ig
t =(IG_Federal+IG_StateLocal)/GDP
ξ
ig,de f ,obs
t =IG_Defense/GDP
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